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BLACK MEN IN A WHITE MAN'S WAR: THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST
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Albert Grundlingh
The past decade in European and Anglo-American
historiography has witnessed a steady growth of literature
in what is generally termed 'war and society' studies. This
development is largely a reaction against the 'drum and
trumpet1 school of military history; a field of inquiry that
may be valid in its own right, but one that often degene-
rates into a discussion of uniforms and badges and seldom
rises above campaigns and battles - the major weakness being
an inclination to divorce the fighting side of war from its
socio-economic and political context. Practitioners in the
field of 'war and society' therefore seek to place warfare
in its total historical milieu and they share inter alia
a common interest in war as an agent of social change.1
In comparison with the position in Britain, America and
Europe, the historiography of 'war and society' in Africa
is relatively underdeveloped. As David Killingray has
recently pointed out in an informative assessment:
The lack of research into the two World Wars
in Africa is reflected in the paucity of
treatment and the assumptions about these two
major turning points in the moderit- history
of the continent that appear in many standard
text books. Greater space has been accorded
to an administrative device, a minor revolt or
a small quasi-political association than to
two major wars which had wide and pervasive
effects on peoples throughout the whole of
Africa.
However, the outlook is not completely bleak and there are
indications (for example a conference held in 1977 at
London University on Africa and the First World War) that the
"ideas about war and society that are familiar to European
history are now being moved south into Africa."2
The terms African 'Blacks1 and 'Africans' are used as
synonyms in this paper.
As far as South Africa is concerned, the Anglo-Boer War
of 1899-1902 has consistently attracted scholarly attention,
but despite the numerous works on this conflict it is only
in a recent publication edited by Peter Warwick and S.B. Spies
that some of the wider effects of the war on the various
societies involved have been investigated in a systematic way.3
Whilst certain advances have been registered in the studies
of the Anglo-Boer War, the same cannot be said of South
Africa's involvement in the First World War. For a background ['
to the war period one is dependent on general, though stimu-
lating, overviews by S.E. Katzenellenbogen1* "and N.G. Garson.5 . ...
Given the lack of interest in South Africa and the First World
War, it is not surprising to find that black participation in
the conflict has passed almost unnoticed. Except for a
pioneering article by Brian Willan on the South African Native
Labour Contingent which served in France,6 little is known
about black involvement and even less about the responses that
such a cataclysmic event as World War One elicited from various
African groupings.
This paper develops some of the issues mooted by Willan
and furthermore attempts to evaluate the general consequences
of the war as they relate to the black population in South
Africa. The topic is being dealt with by focussing on the
following aspects: first, thc» effect of war-time service on
the socio-political consciousness of those South African Blacks
who served as labourers in France and the related question, namely,
whether veterans acted as catalysts for resistance against white
rule on their return to the Union; second, the wider rami-
fications of the war as it affected the political perceptions
and expectations of those Africans outside the military sphere;
and third, the implications of war-related socio-economic,
changes for certain African groupings. The essay concludes
with an assessment of the nature of change wrought by the war
and the hypothesis - common in some studies of 'war and society1
- that underprivileged groups in society tend to benefit from
war-time changes is considered. Within this admittedly
arbitrary framework, only the more salient features are high-
lighted; the paper makes no claim to be exhaustive and to have '
covered the total impact of war.
The South African Native Labour Contingent (S.A.N.L.C.)
was formed by the South African Government in September 1916 in
response to urgent requests from the Imperial authorities for
manpower to expand the military infrastructure for the gigantic
Somme offensive. A suggestion by the Colonial Office that the
Union government might also consider arming Africans for service
in France was summarily rejected since the South African
authorities feared the implications of training Africans in the
use
use of firearms and allowing them to fight against Europeans.
Blacks therefore only served in a non-combatant capacity, and
till January 1918, when the decision was taken to disband the
S.A.N.L.C., 21 000 men left for France where at one stage they
constituted almost 25% of the total military labour force.
Recruitment for the contingent met with considerable black
resistance; partly because Africans did not consider the
military wage of £3 per month (approximately 10% higher than
the average mining wage) as sufficient compensation for the
dangers inherent in war-time labour, but more pertinently
because the South African government, whiah did the recruiting
on behalf of the British, had through its repressive policies
alienated the African population. Various coercive measures
were employed to induce Africans to enlist, but ob-
viously certain recruits also had their own reasons for
joining. A prevailing drought in some rural areas and at-
tendant poverty assisted the authorities to swell the ranks
of the S.A.N.L.C, whilst a criminal element, on the run from
the police in the Witwatersrand area, found a relatively safe
haven in the contingent. For the educated African elite,
who enrolled in numbers disproportionate to the size of their
class in the total black population, the idea to prove their
loyalty to the 'civilising1 Imperial power in an hour of need,
as well as the notion that service abroad was an educative
experience, were important considerations.
In France the various companies of the S.A.N.L.C. were
used mainly for loading and unloading ships in the channel
ports, though some were also employed for work on the railways,
roads, quarries and forests. On the insistence of the South
African government they were isolated-and housed in closed
compounds - the only unit in France to be accommodated in such ~
a way. This extreme measure of social control - a direct
transplant from,in particular, the diamond mines in Kimberley -
was instituted to ensure that members of. the S.A.N.L.C. would
not come into contact with 'harmful social conditions1 in a
foreign country experiencing total war and was regarded as
an essential safeguard to prevent Africans acquiring ideas
which the authorities considered detrimental to white South
African interests.7
The white officers and non-commissioned officers who
accompanied the contingent were carefully selected. They
were mainly officials from the Native Affairs Department and
compound managers drawn from the mines; men who were either
intimately, involved in the implementation of the Union
governments race policies or who were well versed in control-
ing the black labour force on the mines. Their reports on
the effects of war service on the black members of the contin-
gent reflect an almost obsessional tendency to present the
venture as an unqualified 'success1, with the Africans re-
turning to South Africa 'uncontaminated1 and 'unspoilt'.
Because of their own prejudices and vested interests in the
matter, their impressions are heavily biased towards a sanitised
version and the African voice is only audible when it has
been decoded, and even then very rarely.8
Service overseas nevertheless presented Africans with
an opportunity to contrast the crass, or at best, paterna-
listic racism prevailing in South Africa, with the way in
which Whites abroad behaved towards them. Although the
officers tried to ensure that members of the contingent had
limited contact with the civilian population, some of them
did on the odd occasion manage to acquaint themselves with
life outside the compounds. Such encounters with French
civilians gave them sufficient reason to question in a more
searching manner the rigidity of South African society.
"Coming from South Africa, we had fixed ideas about black/
white relationships, so we were surprised that some of the
French would mix freely with us", declared R. Mohapeloa.
Similarly, P. Mabathoana was impressed that "we were treated
with dignity by white people."* Moreover, Jason Jingoes
drew a fine distinction between paternalistic racial at^
titudes and involvement on the basis of equality. The way
in which white women received them with tea and other re-
freshments when they stopped at Liverpool in England before
embarking again for France, caused him to remark: "They
were so friendly and we warmed to their concern for us
Although,white women had served us with tea in Cape Town, we
know they were only doing it because we were going to war.
These girls were different."10
The South African authorities were particularly con-
cerned about the possibility that members of the contingent
might establish intimate relationships with French women;
in fact, this was one of the main reasons for the compound
system. However, some Africans devised resourceful plans
to abscond from the compounds and a few were involved with
French prostitutes who frequented the dockyard areas. The
very nature of such affairs made them momentary and super-
ficial, but there is also evidence to suggest that certain
members formed somewhat more enduring relationships with
French women that went beyond casual sexual flirtation.
It is instructive to note that after the return of the
S.A.N.L.C. to South Africa, the chief censor, J.M. Weaver,
intercepted and destroyed ten letters from French women
to members of the contingent- Weaver argued that such
letters "will give the natives a wrong impression as to their
relative position with regard to Europeans.'!11 Liaisons be-
tween black males and white1 females were not completely
unknown in South Africa; however, white public 'morality1
ensured that they were always clandestine, and when revealed,
such relationships met with near hysteria as a dangerous
aberration that threatened the 6tatu6. quo. l2 In war-torn
France a relatively more permissive atmosphere prevailed
amongst the civilian population,13 and it can be surmised
that particularly those members of the S.A.N.L.C. who were
involved in Black/White affairs become more acutely aware of
the discrepancy and less inclined to viev; the racist ideology
in South Africa as an immutable force.
Through the exigencies of war-time service certain com-
panies of the S.A.JJ.L.C. also came into occasional contact
with white labour battalions which did exactly the same manual
work as Blacks. This exposure, which was in sharp contrast
to the position in South Africa where Whites left most of the
hard labour for Africans to perform, did not fail leave an
imprint. What impressed some Blacks even more though, was
that the Whites in labour battalions displayed little colour
prejudice and treated them as equals.1" Jason Jingoes even
struck up a friendship with a British labourer, named
William John3tone, and it was in this respect that he noted;
"It was our first experience of living in a society without •
a colour bar."15 The implications of black labourers
indentifying with their white counterparts, caused consider-
able distress amongst the white officers in the contingent
- those ever watchful custodians of vested South African
interests. It is therefore not surprising that the policy
adopted was that only in the most pressing circumstances
should Blacks be allowed to work alongside Whites and that'
they otherwise should be kept completely separate in the
work-place.1S
In one respect the carefully controlled labour regimen-
tation of the S.A.N.L.C. in France differed from the standard
procedures usually followed in South Africa, Whereas it was
normal practice on the South African mines to divide the
black labour force along ethnic lines, in France it was de-
cided to integrate the various 'tribes1. Practical consider-
ations dictated this course of action, and it was also
argued that such an arrangement would prevent the possibility
of sympathetic strikes amongst members of the same enthnic
group.1 This had an unintended consequence. The continuous
contact between workers from the different 'tribes' in the work
situation and the fact that they were all exposed to the same
conditions in a white man's war, meant that at least for some
Africans the ethnic affiliations became distinctly blurred.
In an unambiguous statement Z.F. Zibi revealed: "We are not
here as Mfengu, Xhosa and other tribes. We are conscious of
the fact that we Blacks are united in staying together...
Therefore we shall never be de,cei,ved. ... Otherwise it would
mean that we are like people who share mat but quarrel - in
such cases one never sleeps well."18 The exact degree and
intensity of solidarity is difficult to determine, but it seems
clear that to some extent a common consciousness of their
position as workers, as opposed to members of an ethnic group,
began to develop in France.
In a more generalised sense the war-time experiences of
some members also meant an expansion of their world view. On
the way to France several troopships called at Sierra Leone,
where M. Mokwena was particularly impressed by the fact that
he met "some pure black negroes of very high educational
attainments equal to that of the best Europeans...".19 Similarly,
certain Africans regarded the sea voyage and what they
were allowed to witness abroad as formative influences. Thus
D.S. Makoliso, who came from a small Transkeian village, Cala,
Wrote; "I am glad to say that my experiences are more than
any man's in Cala... . My head is full up with new things
and the wonders of the world".20 Likewise, E. Mdlombo viewed
the period spent in France as "an education" which provided him
with new insights and knowledge.21
One outstanding event in France left a very marked impres-
sion. On 10 July 1917 the British king, George V, inspected
and addressed the contingent. For many of the educated Africans
it was an unforgettable experience to see the king in person
- the supreme symbol of Imperial supremacy and British 'justice1
which loomed so large.; in their imagination. "We saw him,
George V, our king, with our own eyes... . To us it is a dream,
^something to wonder at", mused M.L. Posholi.22 What made this
visit even more memorable, is that the king in his address not
only praised them for their labour, but also assured them:
"You are also part of my great armies fighting for the liberty
and freedom of my subjects of all races and creeds throughout
the empire."23 The implications of these words were not lost
on Posholi. "We" are indeed in the midst of great wonders"/ he
wrote, "because we personally heard that we blacks too are
British subjects, children of the father of the great Nation,
trusted ones and helpers, and that we are cared for and loved."*
For some Africans at least, the cumulative effect of their war-
time experience and observations, as well as a hopeful expectancy
that their assistance to the white man in troubled times might yet
yield rewarding dividends, found expression in greater self-
esteem and a less deferential attitude towards Whites, Jason
Jingoes strikingly revealed that "we were aware, when we returned
that we were different from the other people at home. Our
behaviour, as we showed the South Africans, was something more
than they expected from a Native, more like what was expected
among them of a white man."25 Jingoes was not the only one to
experience a change in outlook and to adopt a more assertive
attitude. The commanding officer at the demobilization depot
in Cape Town, major H. Dales, who was in an unique position to
witness the demeanour of time-expired Africans returning from
France, testified from a white point of view that "the conduct
of these natives left much to be desired, great laxity of
discipline being apparent, and their behaviour in general being
a great contrast to that of recruits in training for overseas."26
Although the period spent in France undoubtedly sensitised
certain members, it is of prime importance, in a general assess-
ment of the effects of war time service on the socio-political
consciousness of the participants to consider also those factors
which counteracted the development of increased militancy. Apart
from the fact that the impact of military service obviously-
differed according to individual temperament, personality and
the pre-existing degree of socio-political awareness, members
of the contingent were also exposed to influences which under-
mined their confidence. In this respect they had occasion
to witness the almost inexhaustible armed resources of the
white man and the techniques of modern warfare in France.
This caused some of them to realise that in the face of the
ever increasing military potential of the Whites an African
uprising in South Africa stood even less chance than before
of succeeding. One veteran summed up the situation succinctly
when he said:- "Our.assegais are no good now; they could not
...reach an aeroplane.11.27 . .
Moreover -, it was the avowed policy of the South African
authorities to stifle the potential 'harmful1 effects of war-
time service and the closed compound system was the salient
feature of this policy. Although this system was not com-
pletely successful - black opposition and the practical
military demands caused its imminent breakdown and were the
major considerations in the disbanding of the contingent
in January 191828- it nevertheless severely limited the in- •-:
tensity of exposure to new conditions in a foreign country.
Colonel S.M. Pritchard, commanding officer of the contingent,
probably had sufficient reason to declare in a self-con-
gratulary statement in November 1919:
Knowing as he did the conditions under which
they [the Africans] were employed, knowing
the restrictions placed on their movements,
and the strict discipline enforced, it would
be a remarkable thing if these natives came
back any the worse.29
From a different perspective, what is indeed remarkable under
these circumstances, is that at least some Africans, as in-
dicated, used the restricted opportunities in the way they
did.
This analysis points to the need to maintain a fine balance
in evaluating the effect of participation in a white man's war.
For every participant who returned from France with a changed
outlook, there might have been another who was less affected.
In addition, virtually all the factors in overseas service
which had the potential to broaden the social and political
perception of black members were consciously emasculated by
the South African authorities.
Related to the war-time exposure of S.A.N.L.C. members
were grievances about the callous treatment meted out to them
by South African officers in France and resentment about the
paucity of post-war recognition. Veterans^ received na war
medals or gratuities- Furthermore, the inflated promises
made to lure the unsuspecting into the recruiting net during
1916-17 were simply brushed aside; promises that they would
be relieved from paying poll tax, be exempted from pass laws
and be given free grants o£ land as well as cattle remained
unfulfilled. To add insult to injury, former members were
even expected to pay poll tax for the period they had been
absent from South Africa.30 A disillusioned A.K. Xabanisa
certainly- echoed the sentiments of a considerable number of "
veterans when he wrote: "I am just like a stone which after .;•'• •
killing a bir4* nobody bothers about, no cares to see where >;
it falls."31 It was in this context of post-war disillusionment .,
amongst veterans of the contingent that Edward Roux claimed in .. ':%
his seminal work on black resistance in South Africa: "After ;
1918 there were thousands of black men in the country who were
not willing any longer to endure the anti-Native laws, men who
were prepared to stir up their fellow Africans to revolt :
against the system."32
Did they, however, in practice act as political catalysts?
It remains to explore the links between military service in
France and tangible opposition to white rule in South Africa.
The fact that some members of the S.A.N.L.C. returned from
France with a sharper awareness of their relative deprivation
and were discontented over their post-war treatment, does not
necessarily mean that their feelings and insights were actually
translated into active resistance. It is therefore essential
to consider whether the stimuli of service abroad and all that
accompanied it, were sufficient to galvanise veterans into
political action.
Some ex-members did become active in formal black politics.
Shortly after the war Doyle Modiakgotla joined the Industrial
and Commercial Workers* Union of Africa (I.C.U.) and later
became secretary of the Grlqualand-West branch- In 1920
S.M. Bennet Ncwana also became a member of the I.C.U. and in
addition initiated a short-lived publication. The Black Man.n
Although it is significant that they became overtly involved in
the black cause, there is no firm evidence to suggest that their
war experiences were the prime motivating force. It can only
be surmised that to some extent their exposure in France must
have had a contributory influence.
Other veterans were not be found in formally organised
political opposition, but nevertheless influenced their com-
patriots in more subtle ways. Shortly after his return from
France, L. Molife addressed rural peasants in the Rustenburg
district in the western Transvaal, and assured them in the fol-
lowing terms that their plight would soon be relieved: "The
Germans were building powerful airships, capable of moving an
army - they must not worry, that shortly a German army would
be in Africa and would help them gain their freedom". This
message, endorsed by similar statements from other ex-members,
was received with considerable acclamation.31* The factual
accuracy of Molife's account is of course besides the point;
what is important is its strong millenarian element.
Millenarianism usually reflects a pessimism about the efficacy
of human agencies to effect change and is grounded in a belief
that social transformation can only come about by cataclysmic ex-
traneous means.35 In this particular case Germany was cast in
the role of the saviour who would liberate them from white
oppression. There were, it is true, no large scale post-war
millenarian movements in the Transvaal, but it is nonetheless ;
revealing that certain veterans of the S.A.N.L.C. were in- ,'
strumental in the dissemination of millenarian ideas.
In contrast with the Transvaal, millenarianism was an out-
standing characteristic of rural resistance in the Eastern
Cape and Transkei during the twenties. Here America featured
prominently as the country which would deliver'Africans from
bondage.36 There is some tantalising evidence to suggest that
a few former members of the contingent were involved in these
movements; however/it seems as if they could only have played
a very marginal role,97
On a more individual and personal level some veterans did
not hesitate to demonstrate their sharper perception and increased
self-confidence in everyday and practical South Africansituations.
In the Pietersburg district in the northern Transvaal an anony-
mous ex-member refused to accept passively what he regarded as
exorbitant prices in the local trading store. He confronted the
shopkeeper, named Williams, and a subsequent police report on
the incident strikingly reveals {though this was obviously not
the intention) the way in which this particular veteran asserted
himself:
A native who had recently returned from France
came to his [Williams*] store and stated that
the Europeans were responsible for the high
prices of foodstuffs. He then asked Williams
to whom the ground on which he was trading be-
longed, on receiving a reply that the ground
belonged to Williams, the Native replied, 'the
ground belongs to the Natives and we will show
you.•M
Such instances could be multiplied, but there is no satis-
factory evidence that ex-contingent members were in the vanguard
of sustained and coherent black resistance to white domination.
For example, no indication could be found that former members
were involved in the black industrial unrest on the Witwatersrand
during 1918-19? Nor does it appear, on a somewhat different
level, that veterans acted as 'modernisers* in rural societies.
These events are referred to in Section III of the paper.
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Immediately after his return, Jason Jingoes found (and one
can readily assume that this was not an isolated case) that
"he was thrown back into the old traditional ways."39
The evident lack of involvement on the part of ex-members
in overt resistance seems to prove that war service as such,
for the reasons already mentioned, was not sufficient to
either jolt veterans into revolt or for them to encourage
others to do so. However, it must be borne in mind that -' -^'
even those who possibly contemplated such action, had to :-• ;
consider the fprmidable power of the state to crush any up- ^: ;
rising. It is nevertheless clear that in the SouthAfrican :i2;-•'
case the general assumption that service in a white man's
war is often a catalyst for vigorous black resistance, can-
not be taken for granted. -; When Africans did resist, as they
did on the Witwatersrand in 1918-19, it was not because they
were influenced by "new ideas" emanating from abroad, but
because of the fundumental oppression built into the Souths
 K-
African system or white domination - and they did not have
to go to France to become aware of that.
II
The impact of the war was obviously not only restricted
to those who actually participated. It is therefore im-
portant to delineate the wider effect of the war as it was
manifested in African political responses and perceptions.
Immediately prior to the war, the South African Native
National Congress (S.A.N.N.C.) - founded, as is well known,
in 1912 as an African political organisation and composed
of the educated elite - was involved in sustained protest
against the 1913 Land Act which Left numerous rural Blacks
destitute in the northern provinces and denied Africans
the right to purchase land outside certain limited scheduled
areas. As an important part of their campaign the S.A.N.N.C.
had sent a deputation to England in the early months of 1914 in an
attempt to persuade the Imperial government to intervene s~
on their behalf and to influence the policy being pursued by
the South African government. Although it was abundantly
clear even before the outbreak of war in August 1914 that
the British government was not prepared to pressurise the
Union cabinet, the belief nevertheless persisted amongst
certain S.A.N.N.C. members that the deputation "might have
had a real effect had not the First World War been declared
in the midst of that agitation."110 Besides the obviously
wishful element in this claim, it can also be viewed as an
indication that at the time of the outbreak of war members
of the S.A.N.N.C. were in their own minds still hopeful that
Britain would not completely abandon African interests in
South Africa.
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The S.A.N.N.C. was in session in Bloemfontein when the
hews was conveyed that hostilities had broken out in Europe.
They immediately affirmed their loyalty to King and Empire,
pledged to suspend all public criticism of the Union govern-
ment, and to refrain from agitation in connection with the
1913 Land Act- A delegation from Congress further im-
formed the authorities of African support for the duration
of the conflict.1*1 However, one dissenting voice was heard.
J.T. Gumede, a more militant member of Congress, considered
it essential to keep up criticism of the South African
government despite the war* He argued in March 1915 that
such a policy would be more beneficial to African interests -
"than the present attitude of folding their hands in idle
talk of the war, which they have no right to claim as
theirs... .nt|2
Although Gumede's argument was an exception to the
overwhelming loyalist response, it nevertheless points to
the precarious position of a middle-class constitutionalist
body like the S.A.N.N.C. .. Since they operated through
constitutional channels, they were ultimately dependent
on official goodwill and could hardly have afforded to alienate
the authorities on such a major issue as the war. It would
be wrong, however, to construe their loyalist response and
co-operative stance as an indication of passive acceptance
of their subservient position. Given their limited range of
options to bring about constitutional change, they regarded
loyalty during the war as an additional method to be utilised
in the unequal struggle. In identifying themselves with the
white ruling class in a common cause and openly proclaiming
a common allegiance to the British crown, they expected in due
course to be rewarded for their loyalty. They also hoped that
such an attitude might enable them to pressurise the
authorities into granting meaningful recognition.
In addition, they had implicit trust in the ability of the
British government to effect favourable change. This clearly
influenced their view that an event as cataclysmic as the
First World War would change the nature of the Empire with
corresponding benefits accruing to the African population."13
During the war the S.A.N.N.C. consistently adhered to this
policy. They did, it is true, express criticism on various
issues and gave half-hearted support to strike action on
the Rand in 1918, but their loyalty as such was never in doubt.
Towards the closing stages of the war black participation
in the hostilities had further raised the level of expectancy
amongst African political leaders and they became more strident
in their demands. "We expect to be rewarded for our work
after the war when prizes are distributed to the brave who were
in battle", insisted D.S. Letanka, an influential S.A.N.N.C,
member, in February 1918. ** In April 1918 his colleague.
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L.T. Mvabaza, made a similar point and furthermore located
African aspirations within the context of freedom and
democracy - the declared war aims of the allied forces.
Unambiguously he stated:
That in consideration of the sacrifices the
Bantu have made during this war which we are
continually being told is for democracy and
freedom, the British and the white people
of this land should redress our grievances
and give the freedom for which we lost
thousands of men in this struggle.1*5
It was basically such beliefs - reinforced by statements
of the American president, Woodrow Wilson, and the British
prime minister, David Lloyd George, to the effect that the
post-war settlement should allow sufficient scope for the
self-determination of subjected peoples - that prompted the
S.A.N.N.C. to send yet another deputation to Britain in 1919.
The efforts of this delegation are documented elsewhere and
need no recounting here;1* suffice to say that despite sympathe-
etic remarks by Lloyd George, the deputation was a dismal
failure. In retrospect their attempts to bring about
British constitutional intervention may appear unrealistic
and even naive. This however, would be too harsh a judgement.
Viewed in their own terms and the overall historical context
it becomes clear that in the more hopeful post-war climate
their attempts amount to a resolute move by constitutional
minded men to effect favourable change through the only avenue
they deemed promising and available. "The Great War has ....
.. opened a chance to us, ... let us not lose the chance,"
argued L.T. Mvabaza on the eve of their departure to Britain.1*7
The failure of the deputation left the S.A.N.N.C. disil-
lusioned and eroded their earlier trust in the British govern-
ment. Even Lloyd George's sympathetic attitude was no con-
solation. "Lloyd George said he did not know the black people
were so badly treated in. Africa, but Lloyd George is a white
man and cannot be trusted...," was the reaction of J.D. Ngoja,
a Cape member of the S.A.N.N.C.1*8 In his study of the
African National Congress Peter Walshe regards the fruitless
visit to Britain as a watershed in the history of Congress. •
Its constitutional efforts frustrated, the organisation found
it difficult to realign itself and to adopt decisive new
strategies; consequently its support declined in the post-
war years.w
In assessing the effect of the war on the S.A.N.N.C. it
is clear that increased expectations brought about by the
war only buttressed the aspirations of Congress for a limited
13
period. When it became evident that there would be no
concessions on account of black loyalty and sacrifices,
the organisation lapsed into a mood to political cynicism
which contributed towards its relative stagnation in the
twenties. It would thus appear that viewed from the per-
spective of the twenties the war actually had a detrimental
effect on the position of the S.A.N.N.Q. , However, the sub-
sequent decline of the S.A.N.N.C. can obviously not be
attributed to post-war disillusionment only; other factors,
such as the rise of the more populist I.CO., also played
their part. : .
It. further remains to explore the way in which the war
affected the political perceptions of African groupings
other than the S.A.N.N.C- Often the loyal rhetoric of the
African elite conceals the ferment in the rest of society.
To dispel a notion of general and undisturbed tranquillity
it is necessary to look beyond the utterances emanating
from a few, not necessarily representative, African . leaders.
In contrast with the loyal response of the educated
elite at the outbreak of war, dissenting views were expressed
by the African working class on the Witwatersrand gold mines.
They were quick to draw their own conclusions from the Euro-
pean struggle and relate them to their experiences as an
exploited labour force on the mines. Britain was associated
with the oppressive system in which they found themselves and
therefore Germany was seen as worthy of their sympathies.
On the Nourse Mines L. Ralitane informed his fellow labourers
that "the Germans are beating the English, and you boys are
foolish to work for the English when the Germans are giving
them a hiding." Ralitane's •inflammatory1 views earned him
the option of a £25 fine or aix months' imprisonment.50
Another labourer even more clearly directed his animosity
against the British. "God be with Germany and clear out
all Englishmen on earth," was his fervent wish. "Indeed,"
he continued, "if the German came out in South A.[frica] we
shall be glad if we can help them too."51 Moreover, some
mineworkers also perceived that the war held out opportunities
for resistance against the repressive system in which they
found themselves. The chief compound manager at the Crown
mines reported in September 1914:
I notice a great change the last weeks in
the attitute of the natives towards
Europeans, the natives being very cheeky
and insurbordinate. They appear..... to
have the idea that the Government are
in difficulties owing to the war and are ;
in consequence weak at and frightened of the
natives a
Lack of organisation on the part of these Africans, as
well as the effective controlling agencies of state and
industry - which were particularly pronounced during
war-time -prevented such resistance from taking the form
of concerted mass actions in 1914. Manifestations of
African resistance and their perception of the war as having
liberating potentialities were however no less real.
These responses were not confined to the working clas-
ses in industrial areas- From rural Natal pro-German sympathies
were very much in evidence amongst the Zulu peasant com-
munities. They associated the British with the white
colonization of Natal; if Britain could be defeated, it was
argued, their position might also change. From their pers-
pective any change of the statue quo was regarded as pre-
ferable to the existing dispensation.53 Not surprisingly,
these desperate expectations found expression in millenarian
fantasies. In the Pietermaritzburg district S. Nkabindi
"gained a considerable following as a prophet predicting that
the Whites in South Africa would be annihilated by the
Germans who would then restore the land to their rightful
African owners.51* Likewise, in the Dundee district an
anonymous prophet claimed that Dinuzulu (former head of the
Zulu Royal House who had died in 1913 after being deposed
in 1909 and sentenced to four years* imprisonment for his
part in the Zulu rebellion of 1906) was still alive and that
the Germans would bring him to South Africa and reinstate
him as the supreme African ruler.55
Others did not look to the Germans, but perceived the
war as an opportunity to deliver themselves from bondage.
The magistrate of the Greytown district declared explicitly:
Certain natives are going amongst the tribes ..
. . saying that now the English are at war with
another nation, you have a good chance to
fight them, as England cannot send men to assist.
Why should you forever be under a contract to a
white man...? What are you to do? Your chance
to ease your burdens is to fight the white man
and get your country back.56
Although it must be kept in mind that at the outbreak of the
war Whites were prone to exaggerate the possibility of African
uprisings - a psychological overreaction which had more to
do with white stereotyping and fears than the actual African
response - in this particular case there is no reason to doubt
the veracity of the report.
In the Transkei - where the impact of white rule and settle-
ment was less pervasive - some Africans did not merely indulge
in speculation on the opportunities offered by the outbreak of
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war, but actually ^ used the occation to come out in
revolt. Between 12 and 19 November 1914 an uprising
occurred in the Matatiele district where the Hlubi _
destroyed dipping tanks and burnt and looted a number of
trading stores. The situation seemed critical at the
time and the Whites in the countryside hastly fled into
the town for protection. The Chief Magistrate, W.T.
Brownlee, immediately acted to re-assert white dominance *'
in the district; every available member of the Citizen
Force was called out, armed and rushed by motor car to the
scene of disaffection. Confronted by the armed might of
their white overloads, open resistance on the part of the
Hlubi petered out. . A subsequent report revealed that they
were seriously aggrieved at the way in which the authorities
applied compulsory cattle dipping regulations against East
Coast Fever. Although Matatiele was not a fever-stricken
area, African peasants in the district were nevertheless
forced to comply with the dipping regulations. Moreover,
they had to make weekly payments for such dippings, whilst
white farmers of greater financial means managed to evade
these regulations with impunity. Dipping regulations
were admittedly the focal point of the revolt, but the
timing of the Hlubi resistance to these measures is of
considerable significance in assessing the African res-
ponse to the outbreak of the Great War. The revolt took
place at a time when white authority in the Transkei was
particularly vulnerable since many policemen had been
drafted into the South African Defence Force. It is clear
from a series of meetings held prior to the revolt that the
withdrawal, of a substantial section of the police had not
gone unnoticed amongst the Hlubi. With the white man's
attention diverted by hostilities elsewhere, the opportunity
for meaningful resistance had, as they were clearly aware,
presented itself. To their surprise, however, more armed
men turned out to quell the revolt than they had anticipated.
It is nevertheless clear that the Hlubi reaction to the
outbreak of war represents a definite and organised attempt
to rid themselves of tho obligations imposed by white rulers."
The Hlubi revolt was the only rural African uprising in
the Transkei, or for that matter in South Africa, that can
be related to the war. Perhaps less dramatic, but not
necessarily less important, was the way in whiqh the ,wider
ramifications of the conflict exerted an influence on post-
war millenarian movements in the Transkei. These movements,
already alluded to, were connected with the war as far as
black disillusionment with the failure of the British govern-
ment to intervene in South Africa, shifted the attention to
America, In.1927 W.D. Cingo, a Transkeian journalist,
graphically explained this strand in millenarianism and its
relation to the war:
The Great European War also had its contri-
bution to these illusions. The moral and
military power of America came into prominence.
Her declaration for the'•Self'determination of
smaller nations1... caught the tender ears of
the unsophisticated natives in these parts.
They regard the voice of America as that of a
mighty race of black people overseas, dreaded
by all Europeans Hopes for political and
economic emancipation were revived and today
the word America (iMelika) is a household word .... ;
symbolic of nothing but Bantu National free-
dom and liberty.56
Furthermore/ another occurrence related to the war -
the death of 615 members of the S.A.N.L.C. who lost their
lives when the troopship, the S.S, Mendi, sank off the Isle
of Wight on 21 February 1917 after being rammed by the
S.S. Darro - featured in post-war African thinking. The
memory of the sinking of the Mendi was kept alive by the
Mendi Memorial Club, formed by African ex-servicemen,.
and the annual commemoration of 21 February as *Mendi day1 .
In course of time the actual events of that fateful night
were related in exaggerated heroic terms and assumed a mytho-
logical nationalistic dimension in African group-memory.59
Related to this was the •Mendi Memorial Bursary Fund1 founded
in 1936 to sponsor promising black pupils. A distinct
characteristic of this fund was the perceived need to increase
black self-esteem through education and the importance of
education in the struggle against white domination. During
a Mendi memorial meeting in Johannesburg in 1946, attended
by 20 000 Blacks, it was argued: "The white men are clever
people and the only way to oppose their oppressive measures
is by Education and cleverness."60
It is clear that the wider effects of the war on African
perceptions and responses are evident in a number of dis-
parate ways - reflecting the complex diversity in African
society itself. Nevertheless, one overriding impression that
remains is that several African groupings viewed the war as an
event that could be used for expressing their opposition to
white rule. The war, however, did not constitute a turning
point in this respect; to claim that would mean that the
preceding and subsequent process of African resistance would
be distorted. Neither would it be correct to assume that
all African groupings were affected by the hostilities conducted
beyond the South African borders. Some Africans paid scant
attention to the white man's quarrels. "The feeling came to
be pretty common amongst them," it was reported, "that this
was only one more of those wars to which the Europeans, who
ought to know better, were accustomed, and that it was not in
any vital sense a Bantu concern."61
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III
Apart from the impact of the war on African political
perceptions, certain war-related socio-economic changes also
affected the black population. It was particularly in the
industrial areas of South Africa that these changes made
themselves felt and where the effects were starkly visible.
Shortly after the outbreak of war the directors of Jy-, ''._,-
De Beers decided to suspend all their mining operations on • ;.
the diamond fields. The mining magnates argued that the
uncertain war conditions in Britain and Europe would have
a detrimental effect on the international demand for diamonds.
Beside cheap labour, the profitability of the industry was
dependent on the careful marketing of diamonds and it was
therefore essential to avoid flooding the market at a time
when the international prospects for luxury items like
diamonds appeared decidedly bleak. The possibility of
continuing mining operations and stockpiling diamonds to
market at a later stage was also considered unfeasible be-
cause of the considerable capital investment and high
risk involved. Consequently some 5 000 Whites and 45 000
Blacks were dismissed from the various diamond mines and
mining operations were only resumed on a limited scale in
July 1916. 62
For the mining magnates such a policy made sound financial
sense, but the summary cessation caused considerable resent-
ment amongst the unemployed workers. After the Jagersfontein
mine has been closed down, an indignant white worker asked:
Is it right that a few men who have obtained
their wealth by the labour and sweat of their
employees in Jagersfontein, can stop a whole
industry and plunge a whole town into the
miseries of starvation, to save themselves not
from ruin but from the temporary loss of their
fat dividends and profits?*3
And, one may very well ask, how much more applicable must these
sentiments have been to the black workers who found themselves
on the bottom rung of the labour ladder?
Whilst white workers were offered some financial assist-
to tide them over, no such provision was made for
African workers. Having served their purpose, they were
repatriated without any further ado. Many of them were in
dire distress; without food and little money they streamed
back to poverty-stricken areas which they had actually left
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in the first place-to supplement their meagre income. This
was particularly the case with the Sotho who had left
Basutoland on account of a shortage of food during 1914.
Not surprisingly the police on the border between South
Africa and Basutoland reported that "a disquieting feature
is the behaviour of the natives who are returning from the
diamond fields. Their attitude is mutinous and quite
unlike their usual behaviour."6* Equally clear is the moti-
vation which prompted a number of labourers returning from
Kimberley to Basutoland to plunder a shop in Brandfort and
remove the food supplies in it.65
In contrast with the diamond mines, the production of
gold was uninterrupted by the war; gold being sold at the
fixed price of 85/- per fine ounce. During the war though,
a situation arose on the gold mines which could have had
far-reaching effects for the black labourers. Approximately
25% of the skilled or semi-skilled white labour force left
for active service,66 and the opportunity therefore existed
for Blacks to replace them. The Chamber of Mines was in
favour of such a move - not on account of any 'liberal1
considerations - but only because skilled or semi-skilled
black labour would be cheaper than similar white labour."
However, this did not materialise to any great extent since
the white Mineworkers Union ensured that the places of those
who had left for the front were filled by 'poor white1
Afrikaners.68 Thus, although a few Blacks did move up in
the labour hierarchy during the war, it was hardly of any
significance for the great majorty of the African working
class who made no gains during the war.
The labour supply to the gold mines was not seriously
affected by the military recruitment of Blacks; although
it caused a slight drop, this was off-set by unemployed
workers from the diamond fields finding their way to the
gold mines.69 In the closing stages of hostilities though,
the labour supply became insufficient to satisfy the demands
of an expanding industry and in the aftermath of the war in-
creased production costs, due to war-time inflation, contri-
buted to a serious profitability crisis.70 This had as we
shall see later, important implications for black wage rates
and war-time inflation also contributed to a few "wildcat1
strikes during the war years which foreshadowed the extensive
strike of February 1920 involving 71 000 black workers.71
Strained industrial relations were of course not confined
to the gold mines. Outside the mining industry considerable
labour unrest occurred during 1918-20: the demands for
higher wages in Bloemfontein in February 1919; the large scale
revolt against passes in Johannesburg in March and April 1919;
the dock strike in Cape Town in December 1919 which launched
Clements Kadalie's I.C.U.; and the agitation for wage in-
creases in Port Elizabeth in January 1920. These upheavals,
which were particularly sustained in Johannesburg during 1918-19,
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have been well documented by other historians and will, not
be further discussed here. * However, several writers have
briefly hinted at or merely assumed that the war contri-
buted to the rising tide of militancy. Although this
assertion is undoubtedly valid, it has not been demonstrated,
except for rather vague statements, n how hostilities
conducted mainly in Europe influenced black workers in a
country 10 000 kilometers removed from the seat of war.
Within the context of this paper it is therefore important
to establish the links between the war and labour unrest.
In this respect it is essential to note the rapid
secondary industrialision which occurred during the war years.
.There was a brief decline in trade and industry at the out-
break of war, but soon after that remarkable growth took
place. From 1915-16 the number of factories and other
manufacturing enterprises increased from 3998 to 6890 in 1919-
20 - an Increase of 72%. * Basically this development was
related to the war in that South Africa was unable to import
articles not usually produced locally and local manufacturers
were induced to take advantage of the opportunity created by
diminishing foreign competition whilst the natural protection
which South African industries enjoyed as a result of being
thousands of kilometers from Europe and America was increased
during the war by the rise in freight, insurance and other
import changes as well as the severely reduced commercial
output of the belligerent nations. w The industrial take-
off was closely allied with accelerated urbanisation.
During and immediately after the war, the number of unskilled
workers (mainly Africans) employed in urban industries (ex-
cluding mines) rose dramatically by 83%; from 61 654 in
1915-16 to 113 037 in 1919-20 .w The vast majority of these
workers were concentrated in the industrial heartland of
S.A., the Witwatersrand area, where they were housed in
appalling conditions. The rapid proletarianisation clearly
had important implications for labour unrest and indirectly
the war thus provided the broad socio-economic context for
strained industrial relations. This connection did not go
unnoticed amongst the officials of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment. In a memorandum of May 1919, dealing with the
position of Africans on the Witwatersrand, it was explicitly
pointed out:
"The disorganisation of the commercial world..,.
.. has thrown the British Dominions on their own
resources, and one is amazed at the strides that
have been made in local manufacturing during the
past four years. In short, the war has put the
hand of time forward many years ... and this is
perhaps most noticeable in regard to the
natives... . They have been awakened by the roar
and noise of a universal war < Johannes-
burg has become the centre in which native
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thought has developed most during the war,
and from which native political movements
will radiate It is on the Witwaters-
rand that the native has had the opportunity
of realising what industrial labour strikes
mean".w
Important as war time industrialisation might have been in
accelerating proleterianisation, it was of course, not the
only contributory factor. Underdevelopment of the reserves - ;s
an ongoing process which drove Africans off the land - as well -^ ;,i
the effects of droughts in the rural areas also loomed large ' j!. ;v-
in this transformation. Once again the necessity of balancing ' v'
war-related developments with other trends1in society is . *
evident•
A further consideration in examining the links between.
the war and labour unrest, is that of inflation. As a result
of war conditions in Britain, demand for goods exceeded supply
and consequently prices increased drastically. Since South
Africa had intimate trade links with Britain, this also af-
fected the price structure in the Union, Moreover, banking
and credit facilities were considerably extended during the
war-time industrialisation and the unproductive debt almost
doubled between 1910 and 1920. The cost of living, ac-
cording to official statistics, increased by 15,07% between
1914 and 1918, but there are indications that retail prices
for the same period rose between 31% and 39%.™ Although
white salaries were adjusted accordingly, black wages were
either pegged at pre-war levels or only increased marginally.79
Not surprisingly, the issue of wages become a burning grievance
and the focal point for industrial unrest.
In addition to these developments, the sacrifices made by
African participants in the war also impinged on the ideo-
logical consciousness of Blacks during the unrest on the
Witwatersrand. Thus a black women, E. Mallela, declared at ;
the time of the so-called one shilling strike: "King George
in France said to the natives you are my soldiers. Why
should we be arrested and killed under the Union Jack? We
have helped. We must be free, why should we be slaves?
Think of the blood of our boys in France."80 Essentially
the same point was made by an anonymous African at more or
less the same time: "Some of our brothers are in France
today. Some of us are dying for Botha's Government which do[es]
not give us anything."fll These were not isolated examples
and it can be readily a3sumed that this awareness must have
had a stimulating effect. However, despite the significance
of these war-related ideas actually surfacing on the Rand
during 1918/19, there is no satisfactory evidence that these
were important considerations for spurring either black workers
or petty bourgeoisie elements into revolt.
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The links between the war and labour unrest are there-
fore mainly confined to industrialisation, proletariani-
sation and inflation. Of these, the effects of inflation
on black wages were directly connected with the primary
cause for agitation. However, as P.L. Bonner has noted in
his paper on the unrest on the Rand, it would be wrong "to
exaggerate the importance of this factor [black wages] at J
the expense of the wider range of repressive discriminatory*
mechanisms ....". . The iniquitous pass system, poor
housing and inadequate educational facilities were all inter-
related and integral to the system of labour repression which ,
evoked such sustained resistance. M In evaluating the effect
of the war on urban discontent, these inherent structural in-
equalities are obviously of overriding and paramount importance
war-related developments only served in an oblique way to
expose and emphasise the exploitable position of African
workers*
IV
In his seminal work on war and social change in the Anglo-
American and European context Arthur Marwick has generalised
that "in modern war there is a greater participation on the
part of larger underprivileged groups in society, who tend
correspondingly to benefit, or at least develop a new self-
consciousness." More specifically he contends that parti-
cipation in the war effort involves "a strengthened market
position and hence higher material standards for such groups;
it also engenders a new sense of status, usually leading to
a dropping of former sectional or class barriers."83 In the
southern African context few historians have provided an over-
all assessment of the impact of war, but S.E. Katzenellenbogen
has nonetheless ventured to suggest: "Generally, all social
groups in southern Africa benefitted economically from the
war. Wages were driven up by the greater shortage of
labour..."8"
Katzenellenbogen's assertion can be readily dismissed;
as indicated the economic position of South African Blacks
actually declined during 1914-1918 as a result of war-time
inflation. Although Marwick's generalisation is more subtle
than the foregoing extract would suggest, it is also largely
unacceptable when applied to war-related development in
South Africa. Admittedly participation in the war did serve
to increase the self-esteen and consciousness of certain
Africans, but apart from the enduring effect of the Mendi
disaster, little, if any, practical advances were achieved.
Obviously a key question in determining the impact of
war is whether the war itself actually initiated new trends
or reinforced existing ones. For South Africa, it would be
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claiming too much to aver that the war was responsible for a
completely original departure. However, particularly in the
field of war-time manufacturing and commerce, decisive changes
did occur. "While imperial capital's influence declined",
B. Bozzoli has recently shown, "that of national capital rose;
while the elements that constituted imperial capital were
shaken by the war, those of national capital seized the op-.:
portunity to grow and become firmer..."M Closely allied to
growth of local capital was the extension of social and politi-
cal control over urban Africans in the post-war period - -.,,,-.-.;•
formally embodied in the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas Act.) This
^legislation, as Peter Kallaway has interpreted it, was "the .
;basis of a much tougher political creed, namely the foundation
of a stable urban African community in the towns of South -r,v,
Africa, which would because of its stake in the otatua quot ,,
form a bulwark against labour unrest and political agitators."86
Thus, even from this cursory discussion of the nature of changes
effected by the First World War, it is clearly evident that the
white man's war not only brought greater hardships for Africans
during the war-period, but that war-related developments out-
side their control also had detrimental longterm implications.
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